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ABSTRACT 
In the year 1999 Napster, a provider of music downloading software, broke news 
headlines around the world when copyright infringement lawsuits were filed against the 
company.  Ever since then internet music piracy has been a very controversial topic and a 
target for criminalization efforts.  In the field of criminology there have been few 
attempts to apply theory to the topic of internet music piracy.  Theorization of internet 
music piracy has mainly focused on the illegal behavior of music piracy, explaining the 
motivations and knowledge behind it.  Something that has been neglected in theoretical 
work of online music piracy is its criminalization.  This thesis topic is significant in that it 
is a theoretical application test of Donald Black’s newest theory, Moral Time.  Black, a 
sociologist from the University of Virginia, who is well known for his works The 
Behavior of Law and Sociological Justice introduced this new theory in 2011.  The Moral 
Time theory is a theory of why conflicts occur and why some conflicts are worse than 
others.  Using this theory, four key stages of criminalization efforts taken by the music 
industry are examined and elaborated upon as a means to identify why the music industry 
chose to take the actions it did against online music piracy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the year 1999, Napster, a provider of music downloading software, was the 
focus of news headlines around the world when copyright infringement lawsuits were 
filed against it.  Since then internet music piracy has been a controversial topic and a 
target for criminalization efforts.  Many fields of study have explored the issue, including 
communications, international studies, psychology, history, sociology, economics, and 
legal studies (e.g. Angwin, McBride, & Smith, 2006; Breen, 2008; Chang, Kang, & Ki, 
2006; Condry, 2004; Cooper & Harrison 2001; Cummings, 2010; Katz & Owen, 2004; 
Korpas, Weisz, & Wingrove, 2011; Wall, 2004).  However, within the field of 
criminology online music piracy has been a neglected topic.  Nowhere is this neglect 
more apparent than with regards to the application of theory to internet piracy.  Yet 
theory is a valuable tool for understanding both criminal behavior and criminalization.  
This neglect is unfortunate as theory allows us to understand situations without having to 
experience them directly and predict how to deal effectively with situations before they 
can develope into greater issues. 
Historical Background 
 The exact origins of music piracy are hard to trace.  Cummings (2010) says it                           
began in the 1890s when music firms would copy each other’s music recordings.  Others  
(Beken, Janssens, & Vandaele, 2009; Levy, 1994) point towards the creation of the blank 
cassette tape and personal recorders in the 1960s as being the cause.  Nonetheless, it was 
quite a process to pirate the music an individual wanted.  Compact disks came along in 
1982, and these made it much easier for individuals to pirate music in a more effective 
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way.  Still it wasn’t until 2000 that music piracy was taken to a whole new level.  Since 
the emergence of the peer-to-peer (p2p) file-sharing site Napster in 1999, music sales in 
the U.S. have dropped over 50 percent (Beken, Janssens, & Vandaele 2009).  
 Subsequently various other p2p servers, now commonly referred to as Torrents or 
Bit Torrents, have come about.  These sites work like any other organized criminal 
activity; they spring up for  a few months in response to demand for an illegal community 
and then get shut down or move on, adopting a new name.  It has been estimated that Bit 
torrents are taking upwards of one-third of the internet’s traffic flow (Bergeron & Price 
2008) and have developed into a significant issue, one in need of criminological 
investigation.  Obviously, then, music piracy has come a long way since the advent of the 
cassette tape recorder. 
 During the 1960s, the music industry initiated stronger opposition to piracy.  This 
was done more to maintain a position in the economy as a viable business and to protect 
investments rather than to protect the rights of music artists.  Until this time music piracy 
wasn’t seen as much of a threat to the revenue of the music industry.  This campaign led 
to an increase in the orientation of copyright laws to protect capital interests rather than 
selectively focusing on artists’ rights.  It wasn’t until the 1970s that copyright laws 
became broadened in scope, surpassing the previous focus predominantly on artist 
intellectual property.  This broadening of the law was met with opposition because it 
required such an alteration in federal law.  It wasn’t until 1971 that the recording industry 
received federal protection for its products (Cummings, 2010).  
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Theoretical Background 
 The majority of theoretical work on internet music piracy in criminology uses 
general strain theory, self-control theory, social learning theory, or a combination thereof 
to explain illegal conduct (Hinduja, 2008; Hinduja & Ingram, 2008, 2009).  While these 
theories are appropriate for explaining individuals’ actions and motivations, they do not 
account for why corporations and lawmakers respond in the way they do to piracy.  This 
thesis addresses that void in understanding by applying a new theory introduced by 
Donald Black (2011) to explain music piracy criminalization efforts. 
 Black is a sociologist from the University of Virginia who is well known for his 
works The Behavior of Law (1976) and Sociological Justice (1989).  In The Behavior of 
Law, Black introduces the idea of how social life has several variable aspects, including 
stratification, morphology, culture, organization, and social control.  Black aims at 
mapping out social space and showing the location and direction of law within this space.  
In Sociological Justice, Black proposes that law is primarily a matter of rules.   He states 
that law is a social process in which bias is innate.  Black goes well beyond the 
documented instances of racial discrimination to show how social status (regardless of 
race), the degree of intimacy (e.g., family members, friends, or complete strangers), 
speech, organization, and numerous other factors all greatly influence whether a 
complaint will be filed in court, who will win, and what the punishment (or some other 
remedy) will be. Moreover, he extends his analysis to include not only the litigants, but 
also the lawyers, the jurors, and the judge, describing how their social characteristics can 
also influence a case. 
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 Black’s newest work, Moral Time (2011), expands his previous theorization to 
explain what causes conflict and why some conflicts are considered to be worse than 
others.  Black offers the analogy that conflict is, in its broadest sense, crime and 
punishment.  He conceptualizes conflict as a movement in social time (i.e., as a function 
of social change).  Black goes on to state that conflict, in turn, creates further movements 
of social time and, hence, more conflict the second chapter of this thesis will discuss past 
and present literature on music piracy.  The theory of moral time will be further described 
and interpreted in the third chapter and then applied in the fourth chapter to explain the 
major developments in the criminalization efforts aimed at online music piracy. Chapter 
five will present a discussion of critiques of Black’s theory, limitations of this thesis, and 
suggestions for policy implications and further research. 
Significance of Topic and Statement of Purpose 
 Theorization of internet music piracy has mainly focused on the illegal behavior 
of music pirates (Gealt, Gunter, & Higgins, 2010; Higgins, Marcum, & Wolfe, 2008; 
Ingram, Hinduja, 2009; Korpas, Weisz, & Wingrove, 2011).  This work emphasizes how 
individuals acquire the motivation and knowledge to pirate music online.  Something that 
has been neglected in theoretical work on online music piracy is its criminalization.  This 
thesis topic is significant in that Black’s (2011) conceptualization of conflict can be 
utilized in order to explain and describe the evolution of criminalization efforts directed 
against online music piracy..  
 Online music piracy is a significant phenomenon because it is a worldwide 
epidemic and a notable threat to profit interests (Andersen & Frenz, 2007; Beken, 
Janssens, & Vandaele, 2009; Cummings, 2010).  Different cultures have different ways 
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of defining crime and punishing criminals, which makes piracy criminalization 
complicated and difficult to sort out.  However, Black (2011) contends that understanding 
the genesis of conflict can better position people to anticipate and ultimately manage (but 
not prevent) conflict.  As such, it is hoped that theorization of criminalization, when 
combined with theorization of criminal actions, can be used in a productive manner to 
inform and guide efforts to control online music piracy in a just way. 
 There have been many noteworthy events that have taken place in the fight to 
contain and control online music piracy.  In this thesis four specific stages will be 
discussed.  The first stage involves the initial attack on computer software that enabled 
people to pirate music.  The second stage illustrates the consequences of the first stage 
and how those consequences influenced the music industry to hold individual users 
responsible rather than concentrating on piracy software providers.  Stage three focuses 
on how for many years the music industry attempted to get internet service providers 
involved in the fight against online music piracy. The fourth and final stage presents a 
new way of punishing those who are caught pirating music illegally.  This new response 
to online music piracy is called a graduated response; this involves giving the user 
warnings before taking legal actions.    
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of criminalization efforts 
taken by the music industry towards internet piracy and to better understand those efforts 
by applying Black’s theory of moral time.  Using data on the criminalization of online 
music piracy, this thesis examines how well Black’s theory explains such criminalization 
efforts.  Until the advent of online pirating software (e.g., Napster, Grokster, LimeWire, 
etc.), online music piracy was not a very prominent issue.  The music industry did not 
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begin to see substantial losses from online piracy software until the year 2000 (Beken, 
Janssens, & Vandaele, 2009).  This was about the same time online pirating software 
began to make its debut.  Thus, I began my research on the evolution of criminalization 
starting with the year 1999 and continued on through the year 2012 in order to cover the 
full spectrum.  Additionally, Black’s conceptualization provides a solid tool for making 
better sense of such criminalization efforts.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous Scholarly Research 
A) Theoretical Research 
 Very few attempts have been made to apply criminological theory to online music 
piracy. An exception is found in the work of Dr. Hinduja, a very prominent criminology 
scholar in the field of internet piracy.  In Music Piracy and Crime Theory, Hinduja 
(2006) describes how general strain, social learning theory, and self-control theories are 
well suited to explain online music piracy and those who participate in it.  Hinduja and 
Ingram (2008) studied 2,032 undergraduate students at a large university in the Midwest 
region of the United States.  These students were asked to fill out a survey with questions 
pertaining to past and present downloading behavior, along with multiple measures 
targeting social learning, self-control, and moral beliefs.  Almost half of the sample 
(48.7%) reported downloading over 500 songs over the course of their life time.  It was 
revealed that all of the theoretical variables were significantly associated with music 
piracy.  Self-control had the greatest impact under conditions of low differential 
association, and similar results were found with differential association and ethical 
beliefs.  The effect of differential reinforcement on levels of music piracy was found to 
vary as a function of one’s self control.  Beliefs regarding piracy laws and the effect of 
imitation or modeling on levels of music piracy varied as a function of beliefs regarding 
piracy laws. 
 Holsapple et al. (2008) have also done research on criminological theory as it 
relates to internet piracy.  They show the significance of using routine activities theory, 
8 
 
rational choice theory, and the concept of guardianship to explain internet piracy.  This 
was done in order to explore and identify fundamental parameters that can affect the 
incidence of software piracy.    They applied these frameworks in conducting a 
systematic examination of 75 articles dealing with software piracy.  These researchers 
discovered that definitions of deviant behavior have received little or no attention from 
software-piracy research.  Even though Holsapple et al.’s research focuses on online 
software piracy instead of online music piracy, it nonetheless addresses the online aspects 
of piracy and technological tools required for individuals to pirate via the internet. 
 In the field of sociology, Cooper and Harrison (2001) conducted the first 
sociological analysis of the audio piracy subculture.  This experiment was conducted in 
order to exemplify how pertinent sociological research is regarding online communities.  
Previous to this research, “sociological observations concerning the internet existed 
through vague generalizations and unqualified assertions about what these new virtual 
forms of communication portend (Kellner, 1995) for ‘society’, which offers little in the 
way of concrete social research” (as cited in Cooper and Harrison, 2001, P. 71).  
 Cooper and Harrison examined three main concerns: the activities of audio 
pirates, the underlying motivations for this piracy movement, and how these individuals 
navigate through cyberspace.  The main activity of pirates was to exchange music files 
between one another.  However, they also socialized: “Friendships are made and 
destroyed, and conflicts created and resolved day in and day out” (P. 77).  Within this 
subculture, Cooper and Harrison explain that there are three roles a person can take when 
navigating throughout cyber space: leach, trader, and citizen.  The leach simply is there to 
take what he or she wants without compensating those who supplied it.  Traders enter the 
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virtual environment with the intention of trading music they already have for music they 
wish to obtain.  Citizens (the most respected role) offer music without expecting anything 
in return; they dispense music to traders and leaches alike.   
 Just as in real life there is a type of hierarchy within this virtual society (Cooper & 
Harrison, 2001).   It is in the form of the three roles described above.  The lowest level is 
the leach, the middle class is the traders, and citizens are the highest, holding the most 
power.  Traders have a certain amount of power because they own a lot of current music.  
However, the citizens have a much wider selection of music and a lot of other means of 
obtaining music through interpersonal connections they have made with other citizens.  
Traders do not have these types of connections.  The motivation mentioned for engaging 
in these activities is to become socially revered, and this is done by having the biggest 
collection of music available to others for assentation.  
 Cooper and Harrison’s (2001) study is the first sociological study of the “audio 
piracy” subculture.  It is relevant to this thesis because it can be thought of as a precursor 
to the first stage of criminalization efforts taken by the music industry.  The piracy 
software that enabled individual users to engage in music piracy on their own grew from 
this subculture.  Beforehand individuals had to be rather technologically savvy and know 
whom to ask and where to look in order to obtain music.  
B) Effects of Piracy 
 Most research of online music piracy is focused on its consequence and how to 
deter people from engaging in it.  Beken, Janssens, and Vandaele (2009) looked at the 
effects of piracy on the music industry.  Their research revealed that music piracy is 
responsible for a substantial loss in revenue, over 50 percent. As well, online music 
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piracy comprises almost one-third of the internet’s traffic flow.  According to the music 
industry, there was a causal relation between the growth of P2P networks and the decline 
in CD sales.  The data collected by Beken et al. illustrated that the year 1999 was a 
pivotal turning point: “… the decline starts in the year 2000, global sales started to drop 
in the year 1999. It is the same year that Shawn Fenning started Napster…” (P. 83).  
 Research by Higgins, Marcum, and Wolfe (2008) examined possible methods of 
deterring online music piracy.  These researchers looked at how neutralization methods 
played a role in music piracy with college students.  Their short-term longitudinal study 
recorded digital piracy and intentions of 300 students weekly for four weeks.  It was 
found that over the four week period, both music piracy and neutralization decreased.  
Where results showed the drop in music piracy was linear, the decrease in neutralization 
differed.  Individuals showed a significant difference in initial levels and changes in 
neutralization methods used over the four week period.  It was found that those who 
reported high levels of neutralization in week one tended to report lower levels in week 
four.  
 Gealt, Gunter, and Higgins (2010) followed up on the Higgins et al. (2008) study 
by examining the prominence of those who engage in these illegal activities.  They 
conducted a survey study with 6,249 8th grade students from public-charter schools and 
5,470 11th grade students from Delaware public schools.  It was found that 52.2% of the 
8th grade students reported pirating music; 44.0% pirated music in the past year; 35.1% 
pirated music in the past month; and 16.1% pirated daily.  The results from the 11th grade 
students showed a significant increase with reports of 72.3% pirating in their lifetime, 
63.8% pirating in the past year, 52.8% in the past month, and 25.0% daily.   
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Music Industry Research 
A) RIAA 
 The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has a section on their 
website specifically devoted to the issue of online piracy.  Within this section there are 
five subheadings: “What is online piracy?”, “Who music theft hurts?”, “Scope of the 
problem.”, “Why we do what we do?”, and “The law.”  In the “What is online piracy?” 
portion, the RIAA defines online piracy as “any form of sharing or receiving of 
copyrighted music by means of the internet without purchasing it through legal venues” 
(riaa.com, 2013).  The “Who music theft hurts?” portion explains who is effected when 
music is downloaded illegally including “…songwriters, recording artists, audio 
engineers, computer technicians, talent scouts and marketing specialists, producers, 
publishers and countless others” (riaa.com, 2013).  Under the “Scope of the problem” 
section it is explained that while the music industry may be a large, by business standards 
it is relatively small.  As explained previously, many people are affected.  So theft on this 
scale has noticeable and devastating impacts.   
 Anyone who visits the [Piracy] section of the RIAA website can find out 
everything he or she needs to know about the laws and regulations of owning, obtaining, 
and distributing unauthorized music content in, “The law” portion of this section.  The 
final portion of the [Piracy] section titled, “Why we do what we do”, describes what the 
RIAA is attempting to do and why it is doing it.  The RIAA aims to educate the public on 
the issue of music piracy, expand its market to reach as many users as possible so they 
won’t be tempted to obtain music illegally, and continue to prosecute those who choose 
to engage in copyright infringement violations.  “The single most effective anti-piracy 
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strategy is to help build a thriving legal marketplace. That’s always been the industry’s 
number one priority. Our goal with every anti-piracy effort is to protect the ability of the 
music business to invest in new bands and new music and, in the digital arena, to give 
legal online services space to continue to prosper” (riaa.com, 2013). 
B) IFPI 
 From 2004 until present, the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) has released music market statistics.  These statistics include yearly 
research and findings on digital piracy, government involvement, and internet service 
providers (ISPs).  Also included are international contributions and actions taken from 
other organizations, such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA).  
During the first years of this report, the focus was on music sales statistics and advances 
in the music world, but now the report has come to focus on the issue of online music 
piracy and copyright infringement. 
 The following paragraphs describe the four stage criminalization efforts taken by 
the music industry in order to stop online music piracy.  Online music piracy first made a 
noticeable presence in 1999.  It wasn’t until 2004 that the music industry was able to 
bring legal action against those involved.  The four stages described below are relevant in 
that they depict key components in the music industry’s fight against piracy.  Each stage 
illustrates what issues the music industry faced, the resolutions presented, and the 
reactions to these resolutions on behalf of the pirates and the music industry alike. 
Stage 1: Initial Attack on Piracy Software 
 Initial efforts against online music piracy involved educating the public on the 
issue.  This involved illustrating what constitutes an illegal assertation of music and legal 
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alternatives to these methods.  As the problem persisted, the music industry began to 
bring legal actions against the providers of software that enabled individuals to pirate 
music. Beginning in the year 2004 and continuing throughout 2005, a wave of court 
rulings gave the recording industry the most significant boost yet in the fight against P2P 
piracy.   
 …judgements against Grokster in the US, Kazaa in Australia, and Soribada in 
Korea  and Kuro in Taiwan laid down some key ground rules with global implications for 
the fight against illegal P2P distribution. (IFPI.org 2006, P. 18). 
 Today [2006] P2P networks provide the dominant source of online piracy, and the 
number of infringing music files on the internet stands at just under one billion. (IFPI.org 
2006, P. 16). 
 One case in particular, MGM v. Streamcast/Grokster (2005), was very influential 
because the RIAA lost.  The courts distinguished software that used new technology 
(such as the fast track network) and older software (such as Napster). Newer software did 
not require constant administration to run.  The courts believed that even if those who 
created the software were no longer involved, the software will still be readily available 
for those who choose to download music illegally. Importantly, this shifted the focus of 
criminalization to those who use the software rather than the software and its creators. 
Stage 2: Holding Individuals Responsible 
 Napster was the first big P2P software to hit the internet. This program was 
unique because it focused exclusively on music in the form of MP3 files and had a 
friendly user interface that allowed for easy use.  After Napster, “fast track networks” 
became the new P2P servers. This new technology was an advanced P2P software that 
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allowed downloading multiple sources, thereby making the tracking of internet music 
piracy vastly more difficult.  In 2002, the RIAA began to request individual internet 
customers’ ISP (internet service providers) numbers from their internet providers.  
However, it wasn’t until 2004 that ISPs began to work in cooperation with the music 
industry in the attempt to fight online music piracy. (IFPI.org 2004, P. 11) 
 Operators of unauthorised P2P networks, who encourage the use of their networks 
for copyright infringement, can be held liable for music piracy. P2P services cannot 
simply  turn a blind eye to ongoing illegal activity and profit from massive infringement 
while  avoiding putting in place effective filters or other methods to prevent it. (IFPI.org 
2006,  P. 18). 
IFPI and affiliate recording industry bodies continued the global campaign against 
illegal file-sharing in 2006, bringing legal actions against more than 10,000 individuals in 
18 countries. (IFPI.org 2007, P. 18) 
 These court rulings were momentous in the music industry’s fight against online 
music piracy.  In contrast to previous years, individuals could now be held accountable 
for their involvement with online music piracy.  As good as this might have been, the 
music industry now faced a new challenge.  Now more than ever, the music industry and 
ISPs had to work in cooperation in order to be able to effectively prosecute individuals 
involved in pirating music. 
Stage 3: Getting ISPs Involved 
 Beginning in 2002 the fight against online music piracy turned toward internet 
service providers.  Getting ISPs involved would give those fighting online music piracy 
the vital information they need to criminalize those involved in copyright infringement.  
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This effort started as a means to shut down websites and software that enabled 
individuals to obtain music.  But this all changed in 2005 when the focus of 
criminalization shifted towards users. 
  When consumers of internet services enter into a contract with an ISP, they are 
required to provide very personal information.  With this information, government 
entities can very easily and effectively criminalize people for offenses of copyright 
infringement.   This movement was met with much resistance from both ISPs and citizens 
alike.  
 ISPs should enforce this condition and terminate their service to people using 
their networks to steal and distribute music without permission. IFPI has asked ISPs to 
come  to the table and address these issues voluntarily. Many of them initially made 
promising noises, but the discussions have so far gone nowhere and ISPs have generally 
refused to take effective action. (IFPI.org 2007, P.19). 
 It wasn’t until 2007 that crucial events took place that would enable cooperation between 
ISPs and government entities: 
 The court ruling in the SABAM v Tiscali case in Belgium in September of 2007 
set an  extremely important precedent. It not only confirms that the ISP should take 
proactive steps to block infringing content; it also confirms expert evidence on a range of 
feasible blocking and filtering solutions available to ISPs. (IFPI.org 2008, P. 21). 
 In November 2007, the most significant development yet in this process occurred 
when Nicolas Sarkozy, the French President, announced a potentially revolutionary new 
agreement under which ISPs in France commit to disconnect persistent copyright 
16 
 
infringers on their networks. The move followed a number of significant advances in 
other countries during 2007. (IFPI.org 2008, P. 21). 
 President Sarkozy’s announcement of this agreement influenced many other 
countries, including the United States, Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden, to make similar alterations to their laws.  This was done in the hopes of 
influencing internet service providers to take actions against those who violate copyright 
laws. Resistance was still met. 
 Many countries are now progressing towards concrete steps by ISPs in this area.  
However, the recording industry is prepared to use the courts where voluntary 
collaboration fails. In some countries … IFPI has reluctantly but successfully used 
litigation to require ISPs to disconnect the accounts of users responsible for infringing 
services. (IFPI.org 2008, P. 12). 
Stage 4: A Graduated Response 
 Finally in 2009, the graduated response program became a reality.  While it was 
initially limited to France, South Korea, and Taiwan, this was still a historical movement 
in the fight against music piracy.  The annual report distributed by the IFPI for the 2009 
fiscal year had this to say in order to explain what the graduated response would entail: 
 Under this system, the holders of accounts identified by rights holders as being 
used for infringement are sent notices by their ISP. The notice would advise them to stop 
infringing and suggest the use of a legitimate service that respects copyright and rewards 
rights holders. An escalating series of warnings would result, as a last resort, in 
temporary internet account suspension for those few who refuse to stop. The system 
would protect the anonymity of individuals and would essentially implement the standard 
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terms of ISP subscriber agreements, while conditioning continued service upon 
compliance with the law, particularly copyright. (IFPI.org 2010, P. 24). 
 What this means is that the user will be issued an initial warning when first found 
pirating music illegally.  This warning would recommend that he or she cease in the 
actions they are taking and offer legal alternatives of obtaining music.  If the illegal 
actions of the user continue, ISP would escalate in the severity of the warnings.  
Eventually, this would lead to measures such as bandwidth reduction, protocol blocking 
and, in a worst-case scenario, temporary account suspension.   
 When legal actions are taken against infringing services and individuals, the 
outcome usually ends in one of two ways.  The first option requires those involved to 
either pay a fine(s), serve time in jail/prison, or a combination thereof.  The second 
option, which in the past has been the more preferred option, is to become a legitimate 
distributer of music (IFPI.org 2010, p. 26).  Services would now require their users to pay 
a subscription fee in order to use them. 
 As can be seen, having the assistance of ISPs was crucial in the fight against 
online music piracy.  Without the cooperation of the ISPs, legislation for the graduated 
response would not have been passed.  Research conducted throughout the years of 2008 
and 2009, as reported in the annual IFPI report, has suggested that if a graduated response 
were to be taken, many users would become more deterred from engaging in online 
music piracy.  
 IPSOS research, conducted in France in May 2008, found that 90 per cent of 
consumers would stop illegally file-sharing on receipt of a second warning from their ISP 
as part of a graduated response programme. (IFPI.org 2010, P. 24). 
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 According to a 2009 study by Entertainment Media Research, 45 per cent of 
consumers who downloaded music illegally would definitely stop if a graduated response 
model was implemented. A further 35 per cent claimed they would probably stop. 
(IFPI.org 2010, P. 24). 
 Research conducted for the New Zealand Federation Against Copyright Theft 
(NZFACT) in 2008 found that 70 per cent of internet users in the country aged between 
15 and 30 would stop file-sharing copyright infringing movies if their ISP could suspend 
or terminate their internet account for breaking the law. (IFPI.org 2010, P. 24) 
 In more recent years, other countries have taken a stand against music piracy by 
incorporating a graduated response.  New Zealand enacted the Copyright (Infringing File 
Sharing) Amendment Act 2011, which amended the Copyright Act of 1994.  In the 
United Kingdom, the Digital Economy Act 2010 came into effect in June of 2010, which 
regulated digital music.  The United States is a little different from these other countries.  
The United States uses a voluntary graduated response called the copyright alert system.  
The copyright alert system, which is based on a graduated response framework, is an 
agreement between participating ISPs and intellectual property organizations.   
 In this alert system, a third-party will monitor file-sharing networks, collect the IP 
addresses of suspected copyright infringement, and submit the IP addresses to ISPs who 
will in turn issue the suspected infringer a copyright alert.  Those suspected of copyright 
infringement may be issued six copyright alerts, one for each subsequent infringement.  
Consumers who fail to respond to the alerts may have their connection throttled, though 
their account may not be terminated. 
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 In summation, this chapter has discussed the lack of theoretical literature 
pertaining to the criminalization of online music piracy.  Most theoretical work has 
examined why piracy occurs.  The RIAA and IFPI research gave a better understanding 
of what online music piracy is, who it affects, and what is being done to deal with it.  
Within the IFPI literature, four stages of criminalization were discussed.  Stage one 
involved initiating the attack on music piracy software.  Next, in stage two, the focus 
shifted towards that of the individual users of piracy software.  Stage three showed that 
the music industry needed the assistance of ISPs.  Finally, in stage four the music 
industry was able to incorporate a wide spread punishment of online music piracy.    
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CHAPTER 3 
BLACK’S THEORY OF MORAL TIME 
Overview 
 Black (2011) introduces his theory of moral time by stating that, “Central to the 
theory is a new concept of social time – a distinctively and purely sociological form of 
time: Social time is the dynamic dimension of social space” (pp. 3-4).  Pure sociology is a 
unique theoretical paradigm that has been used to explain variations in legal behavior 
(1995).   Black created this paradigm as a substitution to individualistic and social-
psychological theories.  Pure sociology is very diverse in that it can easily be applied to 
many subjects, such as law, conflict, and conflict management.  It has also been used to 
examine topics of religion, science, lynching, terrorism, genocide, and art (Black, 2004).  
This makes pure sociology ideal for this thesis because it covers such an array of issues 
that very closely relate to online music piracy and the criminalization thereof. 
 Black claims the central cause of conflict is the movement of social time.  As 
depicted in Figure 1, the concept of social time can be thought of as a three dimensional 
space in which social stratification, relational, and cultural factors interplay with each 
another.  Relational space is the degree of intimacy, “… such as the involvement of one 
person or group in the life of another.”  Vertical space refers to the degree of stratification 
or inequality, “… such as the difference in wealth” (Black 2011, p. 4).  Cultural space is 
the degree of diversity, such as a difference in religion or ethnicity.   
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 Figure 1 
Black’s 3D Conception of Social Time 
 Unlike physical space, which is static, social space is constantly shifting. Since 
social time is constantly fluctuating, the movements in relational, vertical, and cultural 
spaces clash and cause conflict.  “Every conflict is itself a movement of social time, and 
conflict therefore causes more conflict, social time is moral time” (Black 2011, P. 4).  
For example, where there might be an increase in relational space, there could 
simultaneously be a decrease in vertical space.  The increase or decrease of one factor 
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will cause a change in one or more other factors, and the end result of this will be some 
type of conflict. 
 Black formats his theory and book around the three concepts of relational, 
vertical, and cultural space. He expands these three concepts by breaking them down into 
six main principles.  These principles are: overintimacy and underintimacy (pertaining to 
relational space), overstratification and understratification (pertaining to vertical space), 
and overdiversity and underdiversity (pertaining to cultural space).  Black further divides 
the six principles into two separate components.  Intimacy is broken down into: (a) 
overinvolvement and underinvolvement and (b) overexposure and underexposure.  
Stratification is broken down into (a) oversuperiority and undersuperiority and (b) 
overinferiority and underinferiority.  Diversity is broken down into (a) overtraditionalism 
and undertraditionalism and (b) overinnovation and underinnovation.  Figure 2 illustrates 
how these concepts interact with one another 
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Figure 2 
Black’s Dimensions of Social Time 
 Each component interacts with one another and moves in and out from the center 
of the spoke of the wheel.  As each component and principle get closer to the center, the 
amount of conflict decreases.  That being said, the further away the components get from 
the center, the greater the conflict.  All these components are juxtaposed with one 
another; this means that as one component moves closer or farther away from the center 
of the spoke, it will influence the movement of one or more of the other components. 
 Each one of the principles has distinctive characteristics.  First is that the faster 
and greater the increase/decrease of the principle, the greater the conflict.  Second, these 
principles are constantly fluctuating and clashing with one another.  Black makes it clear 
that static conditions, such as poverty, are not what cause conflict.  Rather, the source of 
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conflict is dynamic such as if someone were to lose something he or she once had (i.e. 
social standing, money, relationships, etc.).  This is just one example of a dynamic 
situation that might lead to conflict.  The point is that static conditions do not cause 
conflict; it is the dynamic movement in social time that causes conflict. 
Intimacy, Stratification, and Diversity 
 In the following paragraphs, Black’s concepts and principles will be discussed 
and defined.  In Table 1 there are two panels: Panel A and Panel B.  Panel A gives 
Black’s definitions for his six concepts (see Figure 2) while Panel B gives the definitions 
of Black’s twelve principles (also seen in Figure 2). 
Table 1 
Definitions of Black’s Concepts and Principles  
 
Concepts Black’s Definition 
Overintimacy “A decrease in relational distance. I increase my intimacy with 
you when I enter more of your life” (Black 2011, p. 21). 
Underintimacy “An increase in relational distance. I decrease my intimacy with 
you when I reduce contact or conceal more of my life from you” 
(Black 2011, p.21). 
Overstratification “An increase in inequality. You become my inferior if I rise” 
(Black 2011, pp. 59-60). 
Understratification “A decrease in equality.  You become my superior if I fall” 
(Black 2011, pp. 59-60). 
Overdiversity “Any increase in cultural distance. Diversity increases when one 
tradition has contact with another or when something culturally 
new comes into being” (Black 2011, p. 102). 
Underdiversity “Any decrease in cultural distance. As long as I do not accept 
your culture I reject it” (Black 2011, p. 120). 
Panel B: Principles Black’s Definition 
Overinvolvement “Too much involvement is a trespass, and might include 
anything from an overly personal question to a taboo sexual 
relationship, a burglary, a rape, or an invasion” Black 2011, (p. 
22). 
Underinvolvement “Failure to converse to a divorce or declaration of independence; 
failure to honor a contract, return a favor, reciprocate a gift, or 
merely express gratitude” (Black 2011, p. 44). 
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Table 1 (continued). 
Overxposure “Anything normally unseen or unknown, including whatever 
someone would rather not see or know” Black 2011, (p. 36). 
Underexpsoure “Failure to reveal enough about who they are and what they do, 
who and what they know, or what they think and feel” (Black 
2011, p. 51). 
Overinferiority “Falling below others causes conflict as well.  Despite the 
reasons (actions of someone else, one’s own mistakes, etc.) all 
such loses cause trouble” (Black 2011, p. 71).  
Underinferiority “Upward mobility causes conflict when it decreases inequality 
by reducing or eliminating the superiority of superiors” (Black 
2011, p. 89). 
Oversuperority “Success leads to suspicion, resentment, and accusation of 
wrongdoing among those left behind, especially if they are 
falling at the same time. Those who acquire wealth or power or 
other social status often attract dislike” (Black 2011, p. 60). 
Undersuperority “The fall of a superior might mean trouble for someone else, 
especially an inferior.” This could be anything such as modern 
superiors blaming their employees, officers blaming their 
subordinates or coaches blaming their players” (Black 2011, p. 
82-83). 
Overinnovation “New cultures clash and deviate from old and incompatible 
cultures and traditions” (Black 2011, p. 109). 
Underinnovation “A rejection of new culture. Resistance to innovation begets 
resistance in return” (Black 2011, p. 129).  
Overtraditionalism “Some of the most extreme clashes of culture occur when 
people invade and colonize another part of the world radically 
unlike their own” (Black 2011, p. 102). 
Undertraditionalism “A rejection of traditional culture. Traditions struggle to survive 
and followers do not always accept rejection” (Black 2011, pp. 
121-122). 
 
 Overintimacy refers to the upward movement in intimacy to the point of excess.   
“Conflict is a direct function of overintimacy” (Black 2011, p. 22).  Overinvolvement and 
overexposure are two components of overintimacy and are considered to be a trespass 
upon someone else.  Too much involvement, or exposing too much about oneself, may 
make someone feel that their relational space has been invaded. 
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 Underintimacy refers to the downward movement in intimacy, reducing the 
amount of, or concealing, intimacy. “Conflict is a direct function of underintacy” (Black 
2011, p. 44).  Two components of underintimacy are underinvolvement and 
underexposure.  These two components range from anything as small as reducing 
openness and contact with a person all the way to complete separation from a person. 
 Overstratification refers to the upward movement in the stratification dimension.  
It describes the excess of, or providing too much, mobility. Conflict is a direct function of 
overstratification” (Black 2011, p. 60).  Stratification relates to the type of inequality a 
person experiences in life.  Social mobility, both upward and downward, is a change in 
social stratification.  Overstratification refers to the inequalities felt by those who have 
been left behind. “An increase in inequality occurs whenever anyone rises above 
someone else and whenever anyone falls below someone else” (p. 60).  Oversuperiority 
and overinferiority are the two components of overstratification.  Success can cause 
hostility and conflict with those who are unsuccessful and those who have become 
successful.  However, it is downward social mobility that Black considers to be the most 
dangerous factor in promoting social conflict.  The fall of a superior is often viewed as 
the fault of an inferior.  “Surely the guilty party [referring to those who caused the 
superior to fall] was an inferior who resented his wealth and power and wanted to ruin his 
life” (pp. 82-83). 
 Understratification is the downward movement in stratification, reducing the 
amount of mobility.  “Conflict is a direct function of understratification” (Black 2011, p. 
82).  Just as too much inequality between an inferior and a superior is overstratification, 
too little inequality between an inferior and superior is seen as understratification.  
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Undersuperority and underinferiority, two components of understratification, explain that 
the lack of opportunities to engage in upward social mobility, and inferior classes 
becoming part of the superior class, are both causes of conflict.  The lower-classes are 
being repressed by the upper-class through lack of opportunities because upward social 
mobility is seen as a threat to the upper-class. 
 Overdiversity refers to the upward movement in diversity the excess of, or 
providing too much, cultural variation.  “Conflict is a direct function of overdiversity” 
(Black 2011, p. 102).  Diversity is the difference between individual cultures.  Black 
proposes that culture is a zero-sum game: one cannot position himself or herself in a 
neutral position.  One must either choose to accept or reject certain cultures.  Whatever 
culture is accepted, any culture that differs is automatically rejected (p. 101).  
Overtraditionalism and overinnovation refer to the dominant culture having too much 
control over other cultures.  The dominant culture views other cultures as distant and 
morally inferior.  The dominant culture thus has a moral obligation to “civilize” members 
of different cultures or subcultures by wiping out their culture in favor of the dominant 
culture.  The more a culture deviates from the past and the faster it does, the more 
conflict it causes. 
 Underdiversity is the downward movement reducing the amount of, or 
concealing, cultural differences.  “Conflict is a direct function of underdiversity” (Black 
2011, p. 120).  Since some cultures automatically reject other cultures, those involved are 
required to either passively or actively participate.  The active and passive rejections are 
the cause of conflict between the cultures.  Undertraditionalism and underinnovation are 
the two components of underdiversity.   Undertraditionalism rejects the old culture, while 
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underinnovation rejects the new culture.  This is where the differing cultures do not adapt 
to the dominant culture.  Black explains that one example of conflict in traditionalism is 
caused by the common belief that if an individual does not accept a culture, they 
automatically reject it; they cannot simply be neutral (p. 120). 
Conflict 
 Black (2011) concludes his book with a chapter that summarizes how conflict can 
be explained through the lens of pure sociology. Pure sociology is a paradigm created by 
Black as a means to explain human behavior.  His moral time theory is part of the 
paradigm.  “The theory of moral time explains conflict: the clash of right and wrong.  It 
explains why deviant behavior is deviant, and why some deviant behavior is worse - why 
it attracts more punishment or other social control” (Black 2011, p. 137).  Black explains 
how moral time has the ability to become legal time; many facets of our lives have 
become dictated by law. We have the right to diversity (cultural time), opportunity 
(vertical time), and privacy (relational time).  As discussed earlier and illustrated in 
Figure 1, these rights (concepts) move either up or down.  Whether it is engaging in or 
being excluded from, these are our rights. 
 In the final portion of this book,` Black discusses the idea of global morality.  
What Black means by this is that in our current day and age, everyone is connected 
through globalization.  Yet a distinction needs to be made between isolates, who use 
electronics and technology to stay connected, and individuals who might be part of a very 
closer-knit family, tribe, or other type of group.  Black describes the isolates as being; 
“…closer to everyone and everything else and display a greater concern for all, human 
and nonhuman alike” (p. 151).  Individuals who are part of a group are much less so 
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because the values, morals, and beliefs of whatever entity they are part of influence those 
same qualities within the individual;  “…their closeness isolates them from the rest of the 
world, and they have little or no involvement in anyone or anything beyond their own 
group” (p. 150).  Ironically then, it is those who isolate themselves who are the most 
immersed in society, while those who take part in close-knit organizations limit their 
opportunities to become globally connected.   
 Black closes his book with the following paragraph. Who am I? I am alone. I have 
no tribe, no traditions, and no gods. I confess I care only about myself. Yet I am closer to 
everyone and everything. I know the prisoners in the torture cells and the hostages hidden 
in the cellars. I see the bones in the mass graves and the bodies bombed by the believers. 
I feel the suffering of the animals, hear the saws in the trees, and smell the poisons in the 
streams. Their losses are my losses and their rights are my rights. 
    Yes I am selfish. But my self is global. My time is global. And my conflict is 
everywhere. (pp. 151 - 152). 
 In sum, Black bases his theory upon three main concepts: relational, vertical, and 
cultural space. Figure 1 illustrates how the movements of these three concepts relate to 
social time.  Recall again that Black describes conflict as a movement in social time (i.e., 
a function of social change).  As demonstrated in Figure 1, social time is in a three 
dimensional plane that requires the consideration of all the elements of Black’s theory to 
discover where conflict will arise and why.  To understand how conflict arises, one must 
start with the three main concepts (Figure 1).  Once this is accomplished, the focus 
progresses to the six principles (Figure 2).  Finally, after all those have been examined, 
the process ends with the over and under aspects of the six principles (Figure 2). 
30 
 
CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION OF BLACK’S THEORY 
 Many theories could have been used to explain the music industry’s reactions to 
online music piracy.  Black’s (2011) theory was chosen because of its focus on the 
origins of conflict and its practical applicability in criminology.  Online music piracy is a 
global phenomenon that is related to diverse topics that border sociology such as 
communication, psychology, and legal studies.  Sociology is a field of study that aims to 
explain human social behavior.  Black has extended the field of sociology into what he 
calls pure sociology.   
 In Chapter Two of this thesis, the four stage effort to criminalize online music 
piracy was discussed.  It will be recalled that the first stage was the initial attack on 
piracy software.  The second entailed holding individuals responsible.  Third, internet 
service providers became involved, and the fourth was the graduated response.  In this 
chapter, each one of these stages of criminalization shall be dissected using Black’s 
(2011) theory.   
 Within each criminalization stage, the more principles that are involved, the more 
conflict there will be.  “Multidimensional movements of social time are especially 
dangerous, like one explosive substance added to another” (Black, 2011, p. 8).  The more 
principles that are added to the equation, the bigger the explosion, or in this case the 
conflict.   
Precursor Stage 
 The precursor stage is based on the study conducted by Cooper and Harrison 
(2001).  Recall from Chapter Two that Cooper and Harrison analyzed the underground 
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subculture of “audio piracy”.  During this time, the music industry was either unaware of 
this subculture or didn’t have enough motivation or reason to act against these 
individuals.  Eventually these individuals became the main target for criminalization 
efforts, as discussed in stages one and two.  
 The precursor stage is not well conceptualized using Black’s theory of moral time 
because during this stage there was little, if any, conflict between the “audio piracy” 
subculture and the music industry.  The precursor stage is noteworthy because it was the 
buildup period to the first stage of criminalization.  
Stage 1: Initial Attack 
 Stage one was the beginning of efforts at combating online music piracy.  It 
involved initiating the attack on piracy software that enabled online users to download 
music.  The driving force behind this effort was the fact that piracy software decreased 
the inequality gap between the music industry and online users, which was an obvious 
threat to profits.  The music industry, which until this time was the leading entity in 
music distribution, was now having its methods challenged by everyday citizens.  No 
longer did the music industry have complete control over music and how it was obtained 
and distributed.    
A) Intimacy 
 With the advent of piracy software, individual users no longer needed the 
assistance of the music industry in order to obtain music.  All they needed was an internet 
connection and the ability to navigate the web.  At the same time, these users weren’t 
disclosing the way in which they were obtaining music.  Individuals were taking part in 
overinvolvement and underexposure, while the music industry was taking part in 
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underinvolvement. Individuals were stealing copyrighted material from the music 
industry and were reducing the music industry profit margin.  Piracy software was being 
obtained through the means of the internet, and the music industry wasn’t able to put a 
stop to this.  The result was an attack on software providers. 
B) Stratification 
 No longer was the music industry reigning supreme in the music distribution 
market.  Individual people had created software that enabled many other individuals to 
easily bypass the music industry in their attempts to obtain music.  Individuals were 
engaging in oversuperiorty and underinferiority while the music industry was taking part 
in overinferiority and undersuperority.  Individuals didn’t acknowledge and respect the 
music industry as being the main providers of the copyrighted music.  The piracy 
software and individuals using it have become superior to the music industry.  The music 
industry had fallen beneath parties seen as below them; those same individuals had 
decreased the gap of inequality between themselves and the music industry. 
C) Diversity 
 The creation of piracy software and the subculture of audio piracy led to the 
music industry becoming excluded from the very business it created.  Individuals were 
engaging in overtraditionalism, undertaditionalism, and overinnovation, while the music 
industry was taking part in underinnovation.  Individuals were rebelling against the music 
industry’s way of conducting business; they created a new way of obtaining music that 
did not involve the music industry.  Individuals had invaded the business of the music 
industry, taken control of certain portions of it, and ignored the traditional methods of 
how the music industry previously conducted business.   
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 Some principles of Black’s theory are more difficult than others to apply to stage 
one. The subculture of “audio piracy” and the methods/software used to pirate music are 
the target in stage one.  Technological improvements and how individuals manipulated 
those improvements to obtain music illegally were the issues.  It was not until stage two 
that the focus of criminalization efforts shifted toward the individual user.  Punishment is 
a key aspect in Black’s (2011) theory. The music industry was looking to hold someone 
responsible for online music piracy.  This meant the focus of criminalization efforts 
needed to be shifted.   
Stage 2: Shifting Responsibility 
 Stage two shifted responsibility for online music piracy away from software 
providers toward individual users.  Consumers were taking over prerogatives once 
deemed the domain of the music industry.  As Beken et al. (2009) stated, “…the music 
industry always had some sort of monopoly over the distribution of music to customers, 
they soon met with competition from entrepreneurs …” (p. 78).  Technological advances 
on original piracy software had enabled individual users to obtain music without relying 
on someone to constantly manage the piracy software.  The users simply downloaded this 
new piracy software, and they had the ability to search for and obtain music all on their 
own.   
A) Intimacy 
 With the exposure to this newer piracy software, individuals had gained the 
ability to download music on their own.  Individual users were engaging in 
overinvolvement and overexposure, while the music industry was taking part in 
underinvolvement and underexposure.  With the assistance of music piracy software, 
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individuals had become the ones to choose how they obtained music.  Once again the 
music industry had been pushed aside in its own business ventures.  This new piracy 
software, which the music industry had very little information about, enabled individuals 
to download music without any other assistance.  
B) Stratification 
 Stage two is very similar to stage one in that it is a continuation of music industry 
representatives losing power, status, and control to those seen as lower than them.  
Individuals were engaging in oversuperiority and underinferiority, while the music 
industry was experiencing in overinferiority and undersuperority.  In stage one, it was the 
piracy software itself that was taking control over the music industry.  However, in stage 
two the individual users became superior to the music industry.  Users had taken over 
control of the music business; they no longer were dependent on the music industry for 
their music needs. 
C) Diversity 
 Stage one involved the origin of piracy software and its incorporation into the 
“audio piracy” subculture.  This kind of software required routine maintenance and 
upkeep in order to sustain operations.  In the time between stages one and stage two, new 
software had been created that enabled the software to be self-maintaining.  Individuals 
were engaging in overinnovation and undertraditionalism, while the music industry was 
taking part in underinnovation.  Individuals had stepped forward in their resistance to the 
norms set by the music industry.  They were rejecting the established practice of 
purchasing music (undertraditionalism).  New methods of obtaining music were being 
created and used while old means were being discarded and forgotten (overinnovation).  
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Stage 3: ISP Involvement 
 In stage three, a new entity became involved to assist the music industry in its 
fight against online music piracy; internet service providers were that entity.  The music 
industry had a great deal of power over their consumers; however, they were missing a 
key component, and without that component, the music industry was very limited in 
being able to exercise what power they had. During this time, ISPs had a superior 
position of power over the music industry.  Once the music industry realized this, conflict 
began to arise between the ISPs and the music industry.  The music industry was insisting 
that ISPs had power and abilities that the music industry was supposed to have and, as 
stated in Chapter Two, in the SABAM v Tiscali case, ISPs were found to be accountable 
for taking actions against online piracy.    
A) Intimacy 
 Without necessarily knowing it, internet service providers had a great deal of 
power over their customers.  ISPs obtain an incredible amount of personal information 
and knowledge about their customers when customers enter into a contract with the ISP.  
This meant that ISPs were engaging in underinvolvement and overexposure while the 
music industry was left being underexposed.  Underinvolvement is evidenced by music 
industry claims that ISPs were not involving themselves enough in the fight against 
online music piracy by not using the power (which in this case was knowledge of their 
customers) they possessed to fullest potential.  So, there were two different conflicts 
between the ISPs and the music industry.  First, the ISPs had too much power.  Secondly, 
they were not using that power correctly. ISPs had power over their consumers but were 
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not using it (overexposure) and were not sharing the power with the music industry 
(underexposure). 
B) Stratification 
 The ISPs unknowingly were in a position of superiority over the music industry 
(oversuperority).  The music industry could not make any real attempts to stop online 
music piracy without the power of the ISPs.  While this can be considered 
oversuperiorority on the part of the ISPs, the music industry was experiencing 
overinferiority and undersuperority.  ISPs had the power, and the music industry wanted 
it.  The problem was that the ISPs were not willing to allow the music industry to take 
over a part of their business.  ISPs were contractually obligated to their customers and 
were not going to give up information about them or surrender part of their industry 
without a fight.  
C) Diversity 
 As a result of stages one and two, times had changed and the business of music 
distribution would never be the same.  ISPs were engaging in undertraditionalism, while 
the music industry was taking part in underinnovation and overtraditionalism.  ISPs were 
not abiding by the same methods that were once used by the music industry 
(undertraditionalism).  At the same time, the music industry was not willing to accept that 
their previous business model needed to be changed to incorporate new technology.  This 
caused the music industry to react in a way that invaded the ISP’s business model and 
made the ISPs change their way of conducting their business.  
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Stage 4: Graduated Response 
 Stage four consisted of the music industry launching its first real attempt at a 
widespread criminalization effort.  With the settlement between the ISPs, the music 
industry was now able to progress to a state of enacting consistent punishment of 
individuals who were taking part in online music piracy.  This stage is the first time since 
online piracy started that the music industry had made significant progress at regaining 
power over online users.  Prior criminalization efforts were very sporadic and not very 
effective at deterring people from engaging in piracy.  Once the graduated response was 
incorporated, the music industry had an accurate way of detecting and punishing online 
music piracy.   
 Stage four is different from all the other stages in that during this stage the music 
industry attempted to reduce all the principles individual users had previously been 
engaged in.  This is a key stage in the application of Black’s theory.  This is where the 
music industry finally had substantial footing in the fight against anyone who was 
opposing them.  The industry was now positioned to punish and deter online music 
piracy. 
  Black views punishment as a movement in social time in its own right. 
“Punishment is also a movement of social time. Every reaction to deviant behavior alters 
social space: Social control is a movement of social time”. “Deviant behavior and social 
control are reciprocal movements of social time. Just as crime is a movement of social 
time, so the punishment of crime is a movement of social time that corresponds to the 
movement of social time to which it reacts”  (2011, p. 9).  Previously there had been back 
and forth movement between the music industry and those engaging in online music 
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piracy, a form of “cat-and-mouse”.   In stage four, the widespread punishment of online 
music piracy was finally enacted.  Stage four focuses exclusively on the implementations 
of the punishment efforts.   
A) Intimacy 
 As discussed under stage three, the music industry required ISPs to work 
alongside them in order to gain the power required to punish those involved in online 
music piracy.  The music industry was engaging in overinvolvement vis-a-vis the ISPs 
and their customers.  The music industry made ISPs legally obligated to monitor, control, 
and moderate their customers.  ISPs were required to actively look for and report any 
activities of online music piracy.  ISPs were also required to provide vital information on 
their customers to the music industry (overexposure), information that could possibly 
lead to incrimination if a person was found obtaining music illegally online.  This is more 
of a conflict between the ISPs and their customers, but the music industry was the one 
requiring the ISPs to do this. 
B) Stratification 
 The graduated response enabled the music industry to restore the gap of equality 
created by the subculture of audio piracy and those who were taking part in it.  The music 
industry was engaging in underinferiority by doing this.  Individuals who were pirating 
music online created a gap, excluding the music industry from their own business.  The 
gap created by the individuals would forever change the way the music industry 
conducted its business. The graduated response halted this gap from growing any further, 
and in the same effort, tilted this gap in favor of the music industry.  The graduated 
response put the power back into the hands of the music industry (oversuperority). 
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C) Diversity 
 Online users were the first to use the internet as a source of obtaining music, 
leaving the music industry behind.  This was illustrated in stages one and two.  The music 
industry was forced to react as demonstrated in stage three and four.  The music industry 
engaged in overtraditionalism and underinnovation. The incorporation of the graduated 
response enabled the music industry to force its way into the “audio piracy” subculture 
and change the way things had been going over the past few years, a type of 
overinnovation as well as overtraditionalism. 
 During all four stages, many of Black’s concepts, principles, and components 
remain constant throughout.  There has been a constant struggle for superiority, 
innovation, exposure, and traditionalism.    The music industry began as the supreme 
power structure.  Individual users began to take some of that power away.  Then 
individual users created and utilized new technology that enabled everyone to easily 
engage in online music piracy.  The music industry attempted to combat these efforts; 
however, they found it very difficult.  The music industry found the power they needed to 
combat online music piracy, but the power was being controlled by ISPs.  Once again the 
music industry found itself falling beneath another entity (i.e., ISPs).  In order to gain this 
power, which would enable the music industry to regain its position of supremacy and 
profit, the music industry had to take legal actions against the ISPs.  After many years 
and multiple court cases, ISPs were found to be liable for online music piracy and agreed 
to assist the music industry in its fight against piracy.  With this newly found power, the 
music industry was finally able to act in a way that reasserted its original position of 
supremacy by incorporating a graduated response.  The graduated response empowered 
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the music industry with the ability to fully monitor each and every individual’s internet 
usages in hopes of deterring anyone from engaging in online music piracy.  Throughout 
this entire process, conflict was pronounced precisely because it grew out of the 
simultaneous movement of multiple dimensions of social time. 
 Table 2 is an illustration of how well each one of Black’s principles applied to the 
four stages of criminalization.  There are three panels within this table; Panel A rates 
Black’s intimacy concept and its principles, Panel B rates Black’s stratification concept 
and its principles, and Panel C rates Black’s diversity concept and its principles.  In Table 
2 a strong application is designated with a 2, moderate with a 1, and a weak/none with 0.  
It should be noted that while this table is based on my own intimate knowledge of 
Black’s moral time theory and online music piracy, the ratings are subjective and not 
derived from multiple raters, thus making it impossible to estimate interrater reliability. 
Table 2 
Degree of Applicability of Black’s Principles 
Strong - 2, Moderate - 1, Weak/None - 0 
Panel A: Intimacy 
 Overinvolvement Overexposure Underinvolvement Underexposure 
Stage 1 2 0 1 1 
Stage 2 2 2 2 1 
Stage 3 2 1 2 1 
Stage 4 2 1 0 0 
Panel B: Stratification 
 Oversuperority Overinferiority Undersuperority Underinferiority 
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Table 2 (continued). 
Stage 1 1 1 1 1 
Stage 2 2 2 2 2 
Stage 3 2 2 2 0 
Stage 4 1 0 0 2 
Panel C: Diversity 
 Overtraditionalism Overinnovation Undertraditionalism Underinnovation 
Stage 1 1 2 1 1 
Stage 2 2 1 2 2 
Stage 3 2 0 1 1 
Stage 4 2 2 1 2 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Review 
 In 1999, the music industry began its first attempts at criminalizing online music 
piracy.  The virtual community of online music piracy had existed before this time.  
However, it wasn’t until 1999 that the music industry discovered significant negative 
effects that the virtual community was having on industry profits and power.  Members 
of this virtual community were taking over certain responsibilities of the music industry.  
New technologies that were created by some of these individuals gave every user the 
ability to pirate music with simplicity.  It was getting to the point that anyone with an 
internet connection could use piracy as an alternative to purchasing music; the music 
industry was slowly becoming a thing of the past.  In order to effectively combat these 
pirates and penalize those involved, the music industry had to take extreme actions to 
obtain power needed to combat piracy.   
 The music industry found that ISPs had the power needed by the music industry, 
but ISPs were not utilizing this power to the extent desired by the industry.  The music 
industry claimed that ISPs had powers and abilities that did not belong to them and that 
the power would be better situated in the hands of the music industry.  To change this, the 
music industry filed multiple suits against ISPs from 2002 until 2007.  In 2007, upon 
court orders, the music industry and ISPs began to work together for the first time against 
online music piracy.  Finally, the music industry had regained fractions of its superiority 
along with a new partner in the fight against online music piracy.  With this 
accomplishment, the music industry could once again direct its focus to regulating online 
music piracy.   
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 The joining of these two industries was not one sided in anyway.  The motivation 
was profit.  In the 2008 IFPI.org report, chairman and CEO John Kennedy explained 
what ISPs had to gain by becoming involved in the fight against online music piracy.  
“Of course, one key reason for this apparent change is the commercial self-interest of 
ISPs. Unlicensed traffic has always been hogging their bandwidth, but now, as ISPs get 
further invested into the business of digital content, it poses an increasing danger to their 
future revenues.” (p. 3). 
 A brand new method of controlling online music piracy arose from the union of 
the music industry and ISPs. This method was called a graduated response.  It 
incorporated the ability to identify individual pirates on behalf of the information 
provided by ISPs with the legal sanctioning powers of the music industry.  The graduated 
response was the first criminalization effort of its kind in that it was an attempt to control 
online music on a very accurate and expansive scale.   
 This thesis has provided theoretical analysis of four key stages taken by the music 
industry in order to deter and prevent online music piracy. It has also provided a general 
knowledge of online music piracy and Black’s theory of moral time.  In Chapter One, a 
brief history of online music piracy was given along with a brief introduction to the 
theoretical aspects of online music piracy. Chapter One also explained the significance of 
using theory to explain criminalization efforts and introduced the four key stages taken 
by the music industry.  Chapter Two demonstrated the limited supply of literature that 
has used theory in order to explain online music piracy as a behavior.  Chapter Two 
concluded by examining the music industry’s literature on online music piracy and 
providing a detailed description of the four stages introduced in Chapter One. 
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 Chapter Three focused on Black’s (2011) theory of moral time.  This chapter 
broke down Black’s theory into three main concepts and six principles, including over 
and under components to each principle.  Black concludes his book by discussing what 
he calls global morality.  This is the idea that everyone is connected through some type of 
means; however, it is those who seclude themselves that have the strongest connections 
to others. Finally, in Chapter Four, Black’s theory of moral time was applied to the four 
stages taken by the music industry described in Chapter Two.  This was done in order to 
explain why the music industry reacted in the way it did in the fight against online music 
piracy.  The results of this application were the first known theoretical analysis of online 
music piracy criminalization in the discipline of criminology. 
General Conclusions 
 Black’s (2011) theory of moral time was created in order to “… tell us why crime 
is criminal, why one crime is more serious than another, and why crime occurs.  It is all a 
matter of social time” (p. 9).  Applying this theory to the issue of criminalizing online 
music piracy was simple in some respects but difficult in others.  This was illustrated in 
the application chapter of the thesis.  Despite its limitations, moral time theory was a very 
effective tool at explaining the processes culminating in the criminalization of online 
music piracy. 
 Since moral time theory is a theory of conflict, it is readily applied when large 
amounts of principles are involved, thus resulting in large movements in social time and 
pronounced conflict.  Stages one and two had the largest amounts of social movement, 
containing more than ten principles of Black’s theory, as shown in Table 2. This is where 
the music industry lost the majority of its power to piracy software and individual users.  
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Users were becoming too involved in the music business and changed the music industry 
indefinitely.  Stage three involved two corporate entities, the music industry and internet 
service providers.  This stage culminated in a legal battle between the two entities. Even 
though there was a lot of conflict between ISPs and the music industry, Black’s theory 
did less well describing this stage. It was more difficult to apply his theory during this 
stage because his theory seems more closely related to conflicts between micro-social 
interactions involving human entities than to conflicts involving companies and complex 
global organizations.   
 Overall, Black’s theory has done an extraordinarily good job at explaining the 
four criminalization stages of online music piracy.  Stages one and two had a great 
amount of micro-level conflict, making Black’s concept of intimacy easily and readily 
applicable.   Stage three involved two organizations and their conflicting views of power; 
Black’s concepts of stratification and diversity were best at explaining this stage of 
criminalization.  As stated in Chapter Four, stage four is very different from all the other 
stages.  Stage four involved implementation of punishment efforts on behalf of the music 
industry, which Black conceptualizes as a movement in social time in its own right.  
Black’s concepts of stratification and diversity were used to explain this stage.   
Black (2011) proclaims that crime and punishment are reciprocal in nature.  A 
crime occurs and those involved are punished. A criminalization effort is enacted as a 
means to punish and deter the crime from happening again.  After the punishment has 
been given, the criminalization effort is met with a response by those who have been 
affected by it.  Based on that reaction the criminalization effort will need to be altered 
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and shaped.  Both are engaged in a never ending cycle of interaction between one 
another. 
Critiques of and Suggestions for Black’s Theory 
 As a relatively new theory, moral time has not yet had adequate time to be 
thoroughly researched by academics.  So far there has been only one attempt to review 
and critique Black’s most recent work.  To my knowledge there has not been any 
research or articles written other than this thesis and a review by Berry (2013). 
 In her review, Berry gave a description of Black’s theory of moral time and 
offered her own interpretation and suggestions.  One suggestion given for relational time 
was that “… professional ethics violations may be pertinent here. That is, failure to give 
credit for another’s work, as in the case of plagiarism or other copyright violations, may 
serve as underinvolvement” (2013, p. 37).  Later in the review, Berry argues that the 
theory does not take into consideration that “… an absence of change that is based on 
oppressions causes continuing conflicts as experienced by the oppressed class” (p. 37).  
Berry also suggested that if this were to be an experience on the collective apparatus of 
society, then categories of social classification would need to be added (2013, p. 37).  
Despite these criticisms, Berry praises Black’s theory, stating that it is “inspirational” and 
that “scholars of all levels will find this book of interest and utility” (2013, p. 38).    
 Black’s theory of moral time is a pure sociological theory.  This theory can easily 
be applied to the topic of online music piracy even though it focuses on the causes of 
sociological conflict rather than why the crime occurred in the first place.  While Black 
did write about criminological issues (rape, privacy, theft, public nudity, etc.), it is 
important to state that he created pure sociology as an alternative to other theories that 
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attempt to explain human behavior. The theory of moral time provides a tenable account 
of sociological conflict, but it is limited by the fact that it doesn’t take many other fields 
of study into consideration.  Black’s moral time theory could benefit from other fields of 
research, such as psychology or communications.  These fields would broaden the scope 
of Black’s theory as well as provide more support for his notion of global morality. 
 Black provides several illustrations and examples of his concepts and principles.  
The problem is that often times these examples are specific in nature.  They either 
involve a very personal relationship, a very expansive coverage of individuals, a very 
secluded population, or broad notions of interactions and concepts.  Each principle of 
Black’s theory has a specified focus on one of the concepts mentioned above.  Other than 
in the concluding chapter, the only time throughout his book that Black makes a direct 
connection to modern day problems is when he discusses the issues of rape and nudity as 
these relate to the concept intimacy.   
 As for suggestions to improve Black’s theory of moral time, I would like to see 
more detailed incorporation of complex organizations, corporations, large group entities, 
and bureaucratic institutions.  The theory of moral time focuses very closely on micro-
personal relationships and sociological interactions.  Moral time illustrates conflict on a 
very individual and social plane and could benefit from incorporating larger scale 
entities. If Black’s theory were to take macro-scale entities into consideration and policy 
makers were to consider the implications thereof, micro-level conflicts may not even 
manifest themselves and wide scale criminalization efforts, such as the graduated 
response, might not have taken as long to become incorporated. 
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 This theory involves many different concepts, principles, and components. It is 
very easy to get over burdened with all the information presented.  In short, it can be 
argued that the theory lacks parsimony.  In turn, this is a feature that can hinder 
application. 
Limitations 
 This thesis presents a number of limitations.  First, it has taken a sociological 
approach to account for the criminalization of online music piracy by using a theory of 
pure sociology. Pure sociology is good in the sense that is a narrow field of study; 
however, this can be a downfall as well.  The disciplinary narrowness allows for it to 
avoid reductionism.  At the same time the narrowness limits the spectrum from which 
data are collected. 
 Secondly, this research was a conceptual application of Black’s moral time 
theory.  The thesis does not conduct an actual deductive empirical test of this theory.  As 
such, the thesis provides no empirical evidence regarding the theory’s validity. 
Theoretical applications are useful to assist in guiding research and considering policy.  
However, the theory of moral time cannot be fully evaluated in the absence of empirical 
testing.  
 Third, theory-based research on online music piracy is still in its infancy.  Past 
research that has used theory in order to explain online music piracy focuses on the 
actions and motivations of individual pirates.   This limits my thesis and future research 
pertaining to theory and online music piracy alike because there is little background to 
build from.  Once a solid theoretical foundation has been established to guide research 
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efforts, the field will be in better position to build understanding on the causes of online 
piracy and its criminalization.  
 Fourth, this thesis could have focused on different aspects of criminalization 
efforts.  The four stages chosen were based on specific court cases and the music 
industry’s research into online music piracy.  It could be argued that there were other 
stages and factors at play that were as or more important than the ones chosen for this 
thesis.  For example, it has been said that the shift from CD format to MP3s was a case 
for the increase in online music piracy (Beken, Janssens, & Vandaele, 2009). Also, 
during the time frame of this thesis, new criminalization efforts were coming to light and 
were not included.  These new efforts were called the SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) 
and PIPA (Protect IP Act).  
SOPA aimed to expand the ability of U.S. law enforcement to combat online 
trafficking of copyrighted material by limiting business interactions with infringing 
websites and requiring ISPs to block access to these websites.  PIPA was intended to 
hinder the access to rogue websites that allowed for the sale of infringing or counterfeit 
material (House Bill, 2011). 
 Fifth, this thesis concentrated on the conflict involving the music industry, those 
who stood in their way of criminalizing online music piracy, and the actions/reactions 
that followed.  A stronger approach could have been taken to understanding the entire 
subculture of “audio piracy’. This could be done by having its focus directed towards the 
processes the music industry and ISPs had taken and will take in order to catch and 
prosecute pirates.   
50 
 
 Sixth, the rating system depicted in Table 2 was solely based on personal 
knowledge of Black’s moral time theory and online music piracy.  This limits Table 2 in 
that there is no inter rater reliability.  If others were to become familiar with the moral 
time theory and online music piracy, then further application of Black’s theory could be 
made.  If this were to be done, ratings from different people could be compared to look 
for similarities and differences, which would increase the validity and reliability. 
Suggestions for Policy and Future Research 
 The usage of different theories that involve both sociological and legal principles 
could allow a more concrete connection to be drawn between the pirates’ actions and 
criminalizing reactions taken by the music industry.  After research had begun for this 
thesis, the SOPA and PIPA acts were being considered for implementation.  
Incorporating those two acts and the response given by the public in order to stop these 
acts would be an additional stage that could be included in future applications of Black’s 
theory.    
 Given the pace of automation in society, it will not be long until our world 
becomes fully encompassed with technology and virtual communities.  The topic of 
virtual communities and online interaction is not currently a strong focus within 
academia.  This needs to be changed; more research is needed on virtual communities, 
and online interactions need to be conducted in order to illustrate how crucial this field of 
study is and to increase the knowledge base in this area.  There are many similarities and 
differences in the criminalization process of virtual and real domains.  Both domains have 
crime and go through similar criminalization processes, but virtual domains differ in the 
sense that these crimes are often unseen and hard to notice.  This makes virtual crimes 
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more difficult to identify and criminalize because there is a lack of physical evidence and 
materials.  It is simple to see someone steal another person’s wallet, but when someone 
steals copyrighted material, there is no hard proof that a crime occurred. 
 Another suggestion for future research is to focus closely on the culture of “audio 
piracy” and the history of virtual communities.  Studying the buildup to the initial attack 
on online music piracy could assist in explaining what specifically made the music 
industry take its first actions; it could also further explain other actions that followed on 
behalf of the pirates, society, and the music industry.  One way to go about doing this 
research could involve creating an in-depth historical illustration of online music piracy 
that would provide a very useful knowledge base to draw from for future research.  This 
kind of research would assist in discovering how these communities were created and 
possibly reveal future preventative methods of online music piracy.  With this kind of 
information, Black’s theory could be applied in order to anticipate and prevent conflict. 
 Theory is a fantastic tool for discovering how problems might arise and how to 
possibly preempt and address those problems.  Too often decisions are made as a knee 
jerk reaction.  These decisions act as more of a bandage, simply doing “something” so 
that it can be said that a reaction was taken.  If theory were to be incorporated, a stronger, 
more beneficial reaction could be discovered based on the complexity at hand, and the 
problem might be solved rather than masked.   
 Moral time theory can be used to anticipate and prevent future actions that would 
result in conflict.  Employing this theory to inform policy would be beneficial in that the 
practices incorporated would be better suited to deal with or completely avoid conflict.  
Black’s theory holds that conflict is inevitable in social relations, and without the benefit 
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of theoretical guidance, conflict will continue to thrive.  This is exemplified within stages 
one and two; both were filled with conflict and it took over a decade to implement some 
form of significant deterrent.  If a theory such as moral time had been taken into 
consideration from the onset, then conflict may have been lessened in a shorter time 
without as much detrimental effect on society, businesses, and civilians.  
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